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Abstract 
As far as classical physics is concerned, it is possible to trace causal relations between physical 
objects (i.e. particles in this case) back to intrinsic properties of these objects (such as their mass 
and charge). On this view, causal relations turn out to be internal instead of external relations, 
supervening on intrinsic properties of the relata (as proposed by Heil and Lowe). However, one 
can raise doubts about this view already in Newtonian mechanics. The decisive blow to this view 
comes from quantum physics, with Bell’s theorem proving that no dynamics based on local, 
intrinsic properties of quantum objects can yield the empirical predictions of quantum 
mechanics. Nonetheless, quantum entanglement by no means implies that we have to abandon 
an ontology of objects (i.e. substances such as particles) in favour of an ontology of structures 
(as claimed by French and Ladyman). Any of the known proposals for a quantum ontology of 
matter in space-time is committed to objects. However, on any of these proposals, what 
determines the dynamics of these objects are not local, intrinsic properties, but a global or 
holistic property instantiated by all the objects together – that is, a structure that takes all the 
objects in the universe as its relata. The view set out in this paper thus amounts to combining 
ontic structural realism with an ontology of objects that can be conceived as substances. This 
suggestion is illustrated by drawing on the ontology of quantum physics worked out by Bohm 
and Bell. 
1. Introduction 
On the one hand, E. J. Lowe (this volume) and John Heil (this volume, and see Heil 2012, ch. 
7) argue for an ontology according to which there are no fundamental relations. There are 
objects (substances), these objects have intrinsic properties, and all the relations among these 
objects are internal relations in that they supervene on their intrinsic properties. Internal 
relations thus are no addition to what there is. On the other hand, James Ladyman (this 
volume, and see Ladyman and Ross 2007, chs. 1-4) argues for an ontology according to 
which relations in the sense of structures are fundamental. This difference in content goes 
together with a difference in methodology: Lowe and Heil pursue a traditional metaphysics 
based on a priori reflection. Although this metaphysics is supposed to match natural science, 
the metaphysics is not developed by means of considering our best physical theories. 
Ladyman, by contrast, seeks to naturalize metaphysics: metaphysical claims are justifiable 
only insofar as they can be extracted from our best fundamental physical theories and provide 
for an ontology of these theories. 
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This paper takes a middle ground, both as regards the content as well as regards the method 
of metaphysics. As far as the methodology is concerned, it seeks to make a case for a natural 
philosophy that treats physics and metaphysics as one whole, being inseparable, without it 
being possible to accord priority to the one over the other. Thus, metaphysical claims can 
neither be directly read off from the formalism of physical theories, nor can they be based on 
a priori reasoning. As far as the ontology is concerned, the paper argues that the challenge to 
a metaphysics that relies on a commitment to substances and intrinsic properties stems from 
the relations of quantum entanglement, with Bell’s theorem ruling out the possibility of 
reducing these relations to something that is not a fundamental, dynamical relation. However, 
these relations are instantiated by objects (substances) that are individuated independently of 
these relations. In other words, as far as contemporary fundamental physics is concerned, 
there is no cogent reason to abandon the Aristotelian ontology of substances and properties, 
but quantum physics shows that the properties are holistic properties of the configuration of 
matter as a whole and hence relations, instead of intrinsic properties of individual substances. 
In the following, I shall argue for this methodology as well as for this ontology by 
considering in the first place Newtonian mechanics, pointing out how this theory can be taken 
to fit the view of Lowe and Heil (section 2), and then show what exactly changes in the 
transition to quantum physics and how that change puts a constraint on the future 
development of fundamental physics (section 3). 
2. The ontology of Newtonian mechanics 
At the end of the “Opticks” (1704), Newton writes: 
… it seems probable to me, that God in the Beginning form’d Matter in solid, massy, hard, 
impenetrable, moveable Particles … the Changes of corporeal Things are to be placed only in 
the various Separations and new Associations and Motions of these permanent Particles. 
(Question 31, p. 400 in the edition Newton 1952) 
Newton’s natural philosophy (philosophia naturalis) can be seen as replying to three 
questions. The first question is this one: What are the physical objects? Newton’s answer is 
that matter consists in particles that are distributed in a background space, a particle being a 
material object that is so small that it is localized at a point in space, thus being indivisible. 
Hence, some points of space are occupied – a particle is localized at them –, whereas other 
points are empty. 
If one adopts a sparse view of physical properties, there is no reason to make use of the 
notion of properties as far as this basic characterization of matter is concerned. Matter is 
primitive stuff, and it is a primitive fact that some points of space are occupied whereas others 
are not. There is a good reason for conceiving matter in terms of particles, that is, in terms of 
points of space being occupied or empty. If one considered matter to be a continuous stuff 
distributed all over space (that is, gunk), then one would have to maintain that there is more 
stuff at some points of space and less stuff at others in order to be able to accommodate 
variation. But it could not be a primitive matter of fact that there is more stuff at some points 
of space and less at others; a property of the stuff would be needed to account for that 
difference. However, as I shall argue shortly, all the properties that classical mechanics 
attributes to matter concern its temporal development, not simply the fact that there is matter. 
The view of matter consisting in particles can easily pay heed to the fact that there is more 
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matter in some regions of space than in others: in some regions of space, more points are 
occupied than in others. 
The distribution of matter in a background space develops in a background time. That is to 
say, as time passes, there is change in which points of space are occupied and which are 
empty. That change is such that the particles persist in the sense of enduring, each moving on 
a continuous trajectory. Consequently, each particle has an identity in time by which it 
distinguishes itself from all the other particles. The particles can therefore with good reason 
be regarded as substances. The fact that there is change implies that Newton has to answer a 
second question: What are the laws of the temporal development of the physical objects? 
More precisely: What are the properties of the physical objects so that certain laws describe 
their behaviour? Thus, the need for a commitment to properties arises in Newton’s natural 
philosophy when it comes to an account of the temporal development of the physical objects. 
The fact that there is change means that the particles have the property of velocity, velocity 
being the first temporal derivative of position. That is to say, over and above having an initial 
position, the particles have an initial velocity, which makes them move in a certain manner. 
The property of velocity of each particle is conserved, as long as it is the only property that is 
taken into consideration. Thus, velocity gives rises to Newton’s first law, which says that 
given an initial velocity, particles move on a straight line with constant velocity (inertial 
motion). However, it is an empirical fact that there is not only change in the points in space 
that particles occupy as time passes, but also change in their state of motion, that is, change in 
velocity. That is why it is necessary to attribute more properties to the particles than just an 
initial velocity. 
Newton does so in taking the particles to be equipped with mass. In virtue of possessing 
mass, particles accelerate in the sense that they attract each other (gravitational mass) as well 
as resist to acceleration (inertial mass), acceleration being the change of velocity in time and 
thus the second temporal derivative of position. Newton’s second law describes how 
properties change the state of motion of particles. It does so by relying on the notion of forces. 
Thus, in virtue of possessing mass, particles exert a force of attraction upon each other, 
namely the force of gravitation. However, there is no need to subscribe to an ontological 
commitment to forces over and above a commitment to properties of the particles such as 
their mass. Given the masses of the particles, the force of gravitation ensues. It is no addition 
to being.1 The same goes for other properties that account for the change of the state of 
motion of particles in classical physics, such as their charge, giving rise to the electromagnetic 
force. 
Finally, Newton’s natural philosophy has to answer a third question: How do the physical 
objects and their properties explain the observable phenomena? As the quotation above 
shows, Newton answers this question by maintaining that (a) all macrophysical objects are 
composed of microphysical particles and that (b) all differences in macrophysical objects can 
be traced back to the position (arrangement) and the change of position (motion) of the 
microphysical particles. That is to say, the properties that account for the temporal 
development of the position of the particles (that is, their initial velocity and their mass, as 
well as their charge) thereby also account for all the variations in the macrophysical objects. 
                                                
1 As regards the discussion about the ontological status of Newtonian forces, see notably Bigelow, Ellis and 
Pargetter (1988), Wilson (2007) and Massin (2009). 
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Newton’s theory is a paradigmatic example of natural philosophy in that physics and 
metaphysics come together in this theory in an inseparable manner. Newton’s theory is not a 
naturalized metaphysics in the sense of being a positivist metaphysics: the assumption that 
there are particles and that properties of the particles have to be admitted that change the state 
of motion of the particles by accelerating them cannot be derived from any observation. It is 
an ontological postulate. But Newton’s theory is not an a priori metaphysics either: there is 
no a priori justification of the commitment to particles and properties that accelerate them. 
Making these assumptions yields a theory that is both physical-mathematical and 
metaphysical, being a universal physical theory that has the ambition to provide for a 
complete ontology of nature, and whose justification consists in its success in predicting and 
explaining the observable phenomena. 
Let us now consider in more detail the properties that determine the state of motion of the 
particles such as their mass. Is mass an intrinsic property of the particles? A world in which 
only one point of space is occupied at any time – that is, a world with only one particle – is a 
possible world of Newtonian mechanics, given that Newton admits a background space and a 
background time. That one particle would forever continue to be in inertial motion (or to be at 
rest). Consider the widespread view according to which an intrinsic property is a property that 
an object possesses independently of being alone in a world or being accompanied by other 
objects.2 On this view, mass counts as an intrinsic property (as does velocity). 
However, a world in which there is only one particle with mass would be indiscernible 
from a world in which there is only one massless particle. In other words, taking the particle 
to be equipped with the property of mass over and above the fact of a point of space being 
occupied makes no difference as long as one limits oneself to considering possible worlds in 
which only one point of space is occupied at a time. But the lack of a difference in the case of 
a one particle world does not decide against mass being an intrinsic property of the particles. 
If matter is primitive stuff, properties are needed only to account for the manner in which 
the distribution of the primitive stuff in space varies in time, that is, to account for the way in 
which the matter moves. Properties that are admitted in order to do that job are dispositions in 
the sense of properties for which it is essential to play a certain role as described by a law. 
Hence, the answer to the question of whether mass is an intrinsic property in Newtonian 
mechanics depends on whether or not dispositions are intrinsic properties. 
One can with good reason take dispositions to be intrinsic properties. The fact that it is 
essential for them to perform a certain role as described by a law – make matter accelerate in 
a certain manner in the case of mass – does not turn them into relations. Any theory of 
dispositions has to acknowledge the possibility of situations (possible worlds) in which the 
disposition in question exists, but is not manifest. That is to say, any theory of dispositions 
has to allow for situations (possible worlds) in which the disposition in question exists, but 
which are indiscernible from a situation (possible world) in which the disposition in question 
does not exist – as in the case of a Newtonian world with one particle that has mass and a 
Newtonian world with one particle that does not have mass. 
Hence, as far as Newtonian mechanics is concerned, one can indeed make a case for the 
position advanced by Lowe and Heil, namely that causal relations can be traced back to 
                                                
2 See Langton and Lewis (1998 and 2001), as well as Hoffmann-Kolss (2010, first part) for a detailed 
discussion. 
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properties of substances (i.e. particles) that are dispositions and intrinsic properties. Causal 
relations are the manifestations of these dispositions, their effect being change in the 
distribution of matter in space. These are internal relations in the sense that they supervene on 
dispositions that are intrinsic properties of the relata. Consequently, apart from Newton’s 
admission of a background space and a background time, there is no need to be committed to 
anything more than substances (particles) and intrinsic properties of these substances that are 
dispositions, manifesting themselves in a certain form of motion of the particles. 
Instead of regarding mass as a disposition, one may maintain that it is an intrinsic property, 
but that it exercises the role of changing the state of motion of the particles as described by 
the law of gravitation only contingently. That is to say, in other possible worlds, mass plays 
another role. More precisely, considering two different properties (say, mass and charge), it is 
possible that they swap their roles: in a world w2, mass plays the role that charge plays in the 
actual world w1, and charge plays in w2 the role that mass exercises in the actual world w1. 
This view implies that the essence of a property – what the property is – is separated from the 
role that it exercises in a world as described by a law. But what then is the essence of a 
property? The answer to this question that is dominant in the literature holds that it is a pure 
quality, known as quiddity (Lewis 2009); but one may also suggest that properties have a 
primitive numerical identity (Locke 2012). 
However, neither of these answers seems convincing: one may contemplate admitting a 
primitive numerical identity when it comes to primitive stuff filling space, for that stuff is 
nothing else but what occupies space, as are Newtonian particles as sketched out above. But if 
one attributes properties to that stuff, it seems odd to admit a primitive numerical identity for 
these properties as well, for there would then be no reason to take the primitive stuff that 
occupies space to be equipped with properties at all; one has a reason to recognize properties 
of the stuff if and only if one wants something that performs a certain job for the temporal 
development of the stuff. As far as the view of properties being pure qualities is concerned, 
the problem is that it is not intelligible what could constitute a purely qualitative difference 
between two properties (say, mass and charge), given that all the accessible difference that 
justifies recognizing two different properties consists in a difference in the function that these 
properties exercise for the temporal development of the distribution of matter in space as 
expressed by a law. 
The same objection applies to the mixed view of properties of Martin (1997) and Heil 
(2003, ch. 11, and 2012, ch. 4) according to which properties are both qualitative and 
dispositional in one. Again, the question is what could constitute a difference in the 
qualitative aspect of properties such as mass or charge, or what could constitute a reason for 
admitting a qualitative difference that accompanies the difference in the role that properties 
such as mass and charge exercise. Again, one needs properties in one’s ontology of the 
natural world only if one wants something that performs a certain function for the behaviour 
(that is, the temporal development) of the objects that have the properties in question. But 
then it is sufficient to admit properties that are dispositions tout court, that is, properties 
whose essence it is to exercise a certain role as described by a law (see notably Bird 2007). 
There is no risk of a regress or a paradox here, since these properties are instantiated by 
substances whose behaviour they determine. 
Whereas one can thus make a firm case for physical properties being dispositions, one may 
nevertheless raise a doubt about mass being an intrinsic property in Newtonian mechanics. 
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The reason is that, although the strength of the force of gravitational attraction between two 
objects in virtue of each of them possessing a mass depends on their spatial distance, the force 
is supposed to be transmitted instantaneously through empty space without a medium. That is 
why Newton’s theory is taken to be committed to action at a distance: the presence of a mass 
in space at a given time t changes the state of motion of all the objects elsewhere in space at 
that very t. 
However, one may question whether the notion of an instantaneous action at a distance 
makes sense: when there is an object with a certain mass somewhere in space at a given time 
t, the manifestation of its mass is present strictly speaking in all the other objects in the 
universe at that very instant t. Consequently, there is no room for an interaction in the sense 
of the transmission of something. Consider what van Fraassen points out in another context 
(the context is the discussion of non-local quantum correlations to which I will turn in the 
next section): 
To speak of instantaneous travel from X to Y is a mixed or incoherent metaphor, for the entity in 
question is implied to be simultaneously at X and at Y – in which case there is no need for travel, 
for it is at its destination already. … one should say instead that the entity has two (or more) 
coexisting parts, that it is spatially extended. (van Fraassen 1991, p. 351) 
These considerations suggest taking mass to be a relation among the objects in space rather 
than an intrinsic property of each object. That is to say, there is one instantiation of a holistic 
property of mass distribution at any t that relates all the objects in the universe and that fixes 
how each of them changes its state of motion at t. This relational view of mass can admit a 
possible world with only one particle as limiting case: there is exactly one instantiation of 
mass distribution at any t also in that universe, but since there is only one particle that 
instantiates the mass distribution, there is no change in its state of motion. Thus, already in the 
context of Newtonian mechanics, one can argue for the view of there being one holistic 
dispositional property of mass distribution relating all the substances in the universe, instead 
of each of them possessing an intrinsic property that determines the state of motion of the 
substances. 
3. The ontology of quantum mechanics 
Any discussion of the issue of what quantum mechanics tells us about the world faces the 
problem that on the one hand we have a precise formalism for the calculation of probabilities 
for measurement outcomes at our disposal, but that on the other hand this formalism does not 
wear an ontology on its sleeves – it is not possible to read any ontological consequences 
directly off from the formalism. The following, easily accessible thought experiment 
suggested by Einstein at the Solvay conference in Brussels in 1927 illustrates this situation 
(my presentation is based on Norsen 2005): consider a box prepared in Brussels with exactly 
one particle inside the box. The box is split in two halves in Brussels, one half is sent to New 
York, the other half is sent to Tokyo. Suppose that Alice in New York opens the box she 
receives and finds it to be empty. If Alice’s box is empty, it then is a fact that there is a 
particle in the box that Bob receives in Tokyo. 
The quantum formalism represents the particle in the box by means of a wave-function. 
When the box is split and the two halves are sent to New York and to Tokyo, the wave-
function represents the particle in terms of a superposition of its being in the box that travels 
to New York and its being in the box that travels to Tokyo. The operational meaning of this 
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representation is that there is a 50% chance of finding the particle in the box that travels to 
New York and a 50% chance of finding the particle in the box that travels to Tokyo. When 
Alice in New York opens the box she receives and finds it to be empty, the representation by 
means of the wave-function changes such that the wave-function represents the particle to be 
located in the box that travels to Tokyo. That sudden change is known as collapse of the 
wave-function. 
One may try an ontological reading of the wave-function in the sense that it provides a 
literal and thus complete representation of what happens with the particle in this situation. But 
one then faces the consequence that the collapse of the wave-function means that Alice’s 
action of opening the box she receives in New York instantaneously brings it about that there 
is a particle localized in the box in Tokyo. That is what Einstein considered to be spooky 
action at a distance. One may therefore turn to an epistemological reading of the wave-
function in the sense that it provides all the information about the temporal development of 
the particle that we can obtain, without being able to represent the actual trajectory that the 
particle takes. On this reading, the collapse of the wave-function upon Alice’s opening of the 
box she receives in New York simply represents a change in the state of knowledge of the 
observer – once one box has been opened, we know where the particle is, whereas before 
opening the box, we were ignorant of where it is. This reading implies that the particle always 
travels on a classical trajectory, being in one box and not being influenced by whatever 
operation is performed on the other box. This is Einstein’s reading of this thought experiment 
– according to him the only reading that avoids having to acknowledge spooky action at a 
distance. 
However, that reading was refuted by Bell’s theorem in 1964 (reprinted in Bell 2004, ch. 2) 
for the general case, that is, when one considers at least two particles and two different 
observables. In order to understand that refutation, we have to turn to the thought experiment 
that Einstein published together with Podolsky and Rosen in 1935: that thought experiment is 
about a situation in which two particles are prepared at a source and sent in opposite 
directions, with the possibility of measuring at least two different parameters on each particle; 
these parameters are fixed only shortly before the measurement, that is, when the particles are 
already separated by a distance in space that can be arbitrarily large. Bell’s theorem 
establishes that it is not possible to account for the correlated measurement outcomes on the 
basis of the particles travelling on classical trajectories. More generally speaking, Bell proves 
the following: the probabilities for Alice’s measurement outcome in her wing of such an 
experiment are not determined by the parameter she chooses to measure and the past state of 
the quantum system (which may include whatever there is in the past light-cone of her 
measurement operation). Quite to the contrary, the probabilities for Alice’s measurement 
outcome are influenced by Bob’s choice of the parameter to measure in his wing of the 
experiment and the outcome that he obtains, although Bob’s choice of the parameter to 
measure and his outcome are separated by a spacelike interval from Alice’s choice of the 
parameter to measure and her outcome; thus, no signal travelling at most with the speed of 
light could connect them.3 
                                                
3 See Bell’s papers in Bell (2004, in particular the last one ch. 24), Goldstein et al. (2011) for an easily 
accessible presentation of Bell’s theorem and Maudlin (2011) as well as Seevinck and Uffink (2011) for a 
detailed examination. 
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Consequently, the quantum formalism presents us with the following dilemma: on the one 
hand, a merely epistemological ready of the wave-function is ruled out in the general case; on 
the other hand, an ontological reading of the wave-function as providing us with a complete 
representation of physical reality commits us to acknowledging what Einstein termed “spooky 
action at a distance”.4 Hence, it is not possible to read an ontology of the natural world off 
from the formalism of textbook quantum mechanics. In other words, applying a positivist or 
naturalized metaphysics to that formalism is a dead end. However, a priori reasoning can 
obviously not yield an ontology of quantum physics either. What we need in this case, as in 
the case of classical mechanics as set out by Newton, is a natural philosophy that 
accomplishes the following task: it provides for a formalism that grounds the algorithm of 
calculating probabilities for measurement outcomes of textbook quantum mechanics and that 
answers the physical questions left open by that algorithm (the question of what happens in 
the case of Einstein’s boxes is a physical one, not a philosophical one) together with setting 
out an ontology of the natural world, both coming in one package and thus being inseparable. 
In order to achieve that aim, we can use the three questions formulated in the preceding 
section as a guideline. As we employed Newton in order to reply to these questions in the 
context of classical mechanics, so we can turn to Bell in order to answer these questions in the 
context of quantum mechanics. 
Consider the first question: What are the physical objects? One can summarize Bell’s 
reasoning about this question by means of the following four steps: 
(1) Any observable phenomenon, including any measurement outcome, consists in the fact of 
something having a precise localization in physical space, such as, for instance, a pointer 
pointing upwards instead of downwards (see e.g. Bell 2004, p. 166). In other words, any 
measurement outcome consists in a certain distribution of matter in space. 
(2) Macrophysical objects, including the devices that are used as measurement apparatuses, 
can be localized in physical space if and only if the microphysical objects that compose 
them are also localized. 
(3) If one adopts common sense realism as well as experimental realism, macrophysical 
objects are localized even if no one observers them. Hence (from (2)), the microphysical 
objects that compose macrophysical objects are localized independently of whether or not 
anyone makes a measurement. 
(4) Microphysical objects are localized when they build up macrophysical objects if and only 
if they are always localized. Otherwise, one would be committed to spooky action at a 
distance – a measurement operation at a certain location could then have the effect that a 
microphysical object instantaneously adopts a precise localization arbitrarily far apart in 
space. 
This reasoning shows that there is no need to change the answer to the question What are the 
physical objects? when passing from classical to quantum mechanics. The basic ontology 
                                                
4 That commitment could be avoided by refusing to acknowledge that there are any measurement outcomes 
at all, since it arises from the assumption of the collapse of the wave-function in order to take into account 
the fact that there are measurement outcomes (and, in general, well localized classical, macrophysical 
objects). Avoiding that commitment by denying that there are measurement outcomes is the line taken by 
the ontology of quantum physics going back to Everett (1957). See the papers in Saunders et al. (2010) for 
the contemporary discussion. 
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consists in matter distributed in a background space, more precisely in particles existing at 
points in space. 
What has to be changed when passing from classical to quantum mechanics is the law for 
the temporal development of the distribution of matter in space, since classical trajectories of 
particles cannot yield the quantum mechanical probabilities for measurement outcomes. In 
other words, the answer to the question What are the properties of the physical objects so that 
certain laws describe their behaviour? has to change: the particles have to be taken to be 
endowed with other properties than in classical mechanics. 
It is possible to simply add a specific quantum force to the classical forces in order to 
obtain particle trajectories that yield the quantum mechanical probabilities for measurement 
outcomes. This is done in that version of the quantum theory that goes back to Bohm (1952) 
in which a specific quantum force is admitted, known as quantum potential or pilot wave.5 
However, one can with good reason object that simply adding a quantum force when passing 
from classical to quantum mechanics is an ad hoc move: that force cannot be traced back to 
properties of the particles, as the gravitational force can be traced back to mass and the 
electromagnetic force to charge. Moreover, that force cannot be treated in terms of a field 
defined on physical space, for it does not permit to assign values to points of space-time. If 
the wave-function, which is supposed to stand for the quantum force on this view, represents 
a field, it can only be a field on configuration space, that is, the very high dimensional 
mathematical space each point of which corresponds to a possible configuration of the 
particles in physical space. However, it is entirely mysterious how a field on configuration 
space could influence the motion of particles in physical space. 
Let us therefore go one step back and recall the motivation for taking the primitive stuff in 
space to be endowed with properties at all. We need the commitment to properties if we want 
something that determines the temporal development of the distribution of the primitive stuff 
in space. But it is a particular choice made by Newton and further pursued throughout 
classical physics to take the properties that do so to be such that they give rise to forces – such 
as mass providing for the force of gravitation, or charge yielding the electromagnetic force. In 
other words, it is a particular choice made by Newton and further pursued throughout 
classical physics to go for a law of motion that is second order, that is, being about 
acceleration, namely the temporal development of the velocity of the particles. A simpler 
choice would be to examine the temporal development of the position of the particles tout 
court, that is, to put forward a law of motion that is first order, being concerned with what 
determines the velocity of the particles, given their position. In other words, properties in this 
case are needed as that which fixes the velocity of the particles given only their position (and 
not an initial velocity in addition to an initial position). 
There indeed is a quantum theory available that implements this choice, namely the 
dominant contemporary version of the theory going back to Bohm (1952) and cast in an 
elegant manner by Bell (2004, chs. 4 and 17), known today as Bohmian mechanics.6 The 
Bohmian law for the temporal development of the distribution of matter in space is this one: 
                                                
5 See notably Holland (1993) for a detailed account and Belousek (2003) for a defence. 
6 See Goldstein (2006) for a brief presentation and the papers in Dürr, Goldstein and Zanghì (2013) for a 
detailed exposition. 
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 dQdt = v
Ψt(Q)  (1) 
In this law, the quantum mechanical wave-function Ψ has the job to determine the velocity of 
the particles at a time t, given their position at t. The wave-function can perform this job 
because it can with good reason be regarded as referring to a property, namely a dispositional 
property of the particles that determines their temporal development by fixing their velocity.7 
However, the wave-function that figures in equation (1) is the universal wave-function; 
consequently, Q stands for the configuration of all the particles in the universe. That is to say, 
the property that fixes the velocity of any particle at a time t given its position at t is not an 
intrinsic property of that particle. Quite to the contrary, there is only one instantiation of a 
holistic property of all the particles at t, represented by the universal wave-function at t, that 
determines the velocity of each particle at t. That is how Bohmian mechanics accounts for the 
non-local correlations brought out by the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen thought experiment and 
Bell’s theorem. In other words, the trajectories of the particles are not fixed by forces acting 
locally on them, but by a holistic property of all the particles taken together. 
Let us now turn to the third question asked in the preceding section, namely How do the 
physical objects and their properties explain the observable phenomena? Suppose that it has 
to be acknowledged that we are ignorant of the exact initial particle configuration. Suppose 
furthermore that the initial particle configuration is typical in a precise mathematical sense. 
One can then derive the quantum mechanical algorithm for calculating probabilities for 
measurement outcomes in Bohmian mechanics.8 Consequently, Bohmian mechanics grounds 
textbook quantum mechanics in the sense that it provides an ontology of the distribution of 
matter in physical space and a law for the temporal development of that distribution from 
which the textbook algorithm of calculating probabilities for measurement outcomes can be 
deduced. 
Although, strictly speaking, the velocity of any particle at t depends on the position of all 
the other particles at t via the mentioned holistic property, Bohmian mechanics allows for the 
introduction of what is known as effective wave-functions, that is, wave-functions that apply 
to particular local configurations of particles while abstracting from the rest of the universe. 
Bohmian mechanics thereby is in the position to account for both the non-local correlations as 
brought out by Bell’s theorem and for the classical, local character of the environment with 
which we are familiar.9 Thus, in the case of the above mentioned thought experiment with 
one particle in a box, in this case, according to Bohmian mechanics, the particle moves on a 
classical trajectory in one of the two boxes, with operations performed on the other box 
having no influence on its trajectory. Hence, in brief, as regards the third question, there is no 
reason to change the answer to that question either when passing from classical to quantum 
mechanics: (a) all macrophysical objects are composed of microphysical particles and (b) all 
differences in macrophysical objects can be traced back to the position (arrangement) and the 
change of position (motion) of the microphysical particles. The only difference is that instead 
of intrinsic and thus local properties accounting for the motion of the particles, a holistic 
property of all the particles taken together does so. 
                                                
7 See Belot (2012, pp. 77-80) for a sketch and Esfeld et al. (2013) for a detailed argumentation. 
8 See Dürr, Goldstein and Zanghì (2013, ch. 2). 
9 See Dürr, Goldstein and Zanghì (2013, ch. 5). 
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However, as mentioned at the end of the previous section, one can already conceive an 
ontology of Newtonian mechanics in terms of one instantiation of a holistic property of mass 
distribution at any time t that relates all the objects in the universe and that fixes how each of 
them changes its state of motion at t. By the same token, one can take the universal wave-
function in quantum mechanics to refer to one instantiation of a holistic property that relates 
all the objects in the universe and that fixes the velocity of each of them, given the position of 
all the particles. But this latter holism is in any case more radical than the one that one can 
contemplate with respect to Newtonian mechanics: the universal wave-function in quantum 
mechanics does not represent the distribution of a property of objects (as there is in any case a 
mass distribution in Newtonian mechanics such that each object has a certain value of mass), 
but exactly one instantiation of a holistic property of all the particles taken together. That 
property determines the velocity of each particle, but it is not a property possessed by each 
particle – due to the non-separability of the wave-function, there is only one wave-function 
for the whole particle configuration. Nonetheless, quantum mechanics, like Newtonian 
mechanics, admits a possible world with only one particle as limiting case: that particle has a 
wave-function, and that wave-function represents the property of that particle which fixes its 
temporal development. To put it differently, for any possible world, there is exactly one 
universal wave-function representing the property that fixes the temporal development of the 
objects in that world, whatever their number may be. 
Bohm’s quantum theory, as set out by Bell, is generally perceived as implementing the 
most minimal change in ontology that one has to concede when passing from classical to 
quantum mechanics. One may go further and notably abandon the commitment to particles. 
Thus, other proposals to conceive matter in quantum mechanics notably include a continuous 
distribution of stuff in physical space (a mass density field)10 and sparsely distributed discrete 
point events, known as flashes, which do not make up continuous trajectories or worldlines.11 
However, in any case, whatever the distribution of matter in physical space may be, there is 
no possibility to account for its temporal development on the basis of local and hence intrinsic 
properties, given Bell’s theorem. On any account, the temporal development of the 
distribution of matter in physical space is fixed by a holistic and dispositional property 
instantiated by the matter distribution as a whole and represented by the universal wave-
function. 
That is the reason why quantum physics lends support to the view known as ontic structural 
realism: the mentioned holistic property is a structure, because it relates everything that makes 
up the distribution of matter in space. However, that property or structure is instantiated by 
something, namely the distribution of matter in space, in whatever entities that distribution 
may consist. Consequently, the distribution of matter in physical space, whatever types of 
entities constitute it, is at any time t individuated independently of that property or structure, 
on whatever individuation conditions may apply to particles, a mass density field, or flashes 
(for instance, particles and flashes are individuated by their position in space – there is a 
number n of particles or flashes in space at t given by the number of points that are occupied 
at t). Nonetheless, that holistic property or structure may provide for an intertemporal identity 
of the entities that constitute the distribution of matter in space – as in the case of Bohmian 
                                                
10 See Ghirardi et al. (1995) and Monton (2004). 
11 See Bell (2004, ch. 22) and Tumulka (2006). 
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particles, it fixes a continuous trajectory for each particle that is characteristic of the particle 
in question. 
In short, there is a configuration of matter in space, and the reason why this configuration 
instantiates a certain structure or holistic property is that this structure or holistic property 
does the job of determining the temporal development of the distribution of matter in space 
and thereby also is able to account for measurement outcomes.12 If, by contrast, one 
maintains that there are structures all the way down (as do French and Ladyman)13 – so that 
there are no objects that instantiate the structures and that consequently are individuated 
independently of the structures in question –, one cannot let the structures perform the job of 
determining the temporal development of something and one thereby jettisons the possibility 
to account for measurement outcomes in quantum physics. 
Elaborating on the mentioned holism in terms of ontic structural realism can also help to 
bring out the contrast with action at a distance. Bell’s theorem rules out Einstein’s 
epistemological view of the quantum mechanical wave-function, but we are thereby not 
committed to falling back to what Einstein considers as spooky action at a distance. Bohmian 
mechanics, conceived as a first order theory without a specific quantum force as sketched out 
above, can illustrate this issue: there is no question of a direct interaction among the particles 
in Bohmian mechanics – such an interaction would indeed be action at a distance. Instead of 
interacting directly with each other, the particles are related through the holistic property or 
structure that determines the velocity of each of them at a time t given the position of all of 
them at t. There is of course indirect interaction among the particles in that a local change in 
the arrangement of particles (e.g. fixing a parameter in a Bell-type experiment, opening or 
closing one slit in a double slit experiment, etc.) can influence the velocity of strictly speaking 
all the other particles, whatever their distance in space is – but it does so through the 
mentioned structure or holistic property instantiated by all the particles, by contrast to direct 
interaction among the particles. 
When passing from quantum mechanics to quantum field theory and quantum gravity, the 
mentioned holism is not only confirmed, but moreover strengthened. In what is known as 
relativistic quantum field theory, despite its being relativistic, Bell’s theorem applies: the 
probabilities for a certain event to occur at a given space-time point are not fixed by what 
there is in the past light cone of the event in question, but also depend on what happens at  
spacelike separated points (see Bell 2004, ch. 24). The main change with respect to quantum 
mechanics is the following one: whereas the quantum mechanical algorithm for calculating 
probabilities for measurement outcomes can be derived from an ontology that is committed to 
a fixed number of particles whose trajectories are determined by a holistic property 
instantiated by the configuration of all the particles, it seems that one has to make room for 
events of particle creation and annihilation in quantum field theory. Thus, if one retains the 
commitment to particles and if one takes particles to be substances, one has to allow for 
substances to come into and go out of existence. In any case, whatever one takes the 
distribution of matter in space to be, that distribution instantiates as a whole a structure or 
holistic property that fixes its temporal development and that is represented by the universal 
wave-function. In other words, there is in any case a good reason in quantum field theory to 
                                                
12 See Esfeld and Lam (2011) as well as Esfeld (2013) for setting out ontic structural realism in that sense. 
13 See notably French (forthcoming) and Ladyman and Ross (2007). 
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endorse the commitment to a holistic property of the distribution of matter in space that fixes 
its temporal development, even if that property no longer provides for an intertemporal 
identity of particles (as it does in Newtonian mechanics as well as in non-relativistic Bohmian 
mechanics).14 
In quantum gravity, there no longer is a background space and a background time in which 
matter is inserted, but space and time are themselves treated as quantum objects. Accordingly, 
there no longer is a universal wave-function that develops itself in a background time. Quite 
to the contrary, the universal wave-function is stationary, the Schrödinger equation being 
replaced with the Wheeler-deWitt equation. Nonetheless, the universal wave-function can still 
be regarded as referring to a configuration of elementary objects, such as a configuration of 
elementary parts of space (or a configuration of elementary parts of space-cum-matter), and 
representing a holistic property of such a configuration that fixes the transition from one such 
configuration to the next one such that something approximating the classical space-time of 
general relativity theory is built up. In such a scenario, the holism that is characteristic of 
quantum physics is strengthened, since whatever relationship holds between the subsequent 
configurations of elementary objects is given entirely by the mentioned holistic property that 
is instantiated by any such configuration and that is represented by the universal, stationary 
wave-function.15 
In sum, the crucial difference between classical and quantum mechanics is this one: in 
classical mechanics, there are dispositional properties of the particles that fix their temporal 
development in the sense of fixing the temporal development of their velocity (acceleration), 
and these properties can be conceived as intrinsic properties of each particle. As far as what is 
specific for quantum physics is concerned, there are no intrinsic properties of particles, but 
only one structure or holistic property that determines the temporal development of the 
distribution of matter in space (determining in the case of particles the temporal development 
of their position by fixing the velocity of each particle). Since Bell’s theorem can with good 
reason be taken to put a constraint on any future physical theory, there is no prospect of going 
back to intrinsic properties in the ontology of the natural world. Relations will in any case 
have to be recognized as fundamental, as stressed by ontic structural realism. However, these 
relations are instantiated by objects, and one may conceive these objects as substances, even if 
one has to abandon some features that are traditionally associated with the notion of a 
substance. 
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